

HISTORY

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THE JUNITER MISSILE SYSTEM

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CONTENTS

CHAPTE	<u>R</u>	PAGE
	FRONTISPIECE	iv
	PREFACE	viii
	LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	×
	LIST OF APPENDICES	хi
	W W	
ı. I	EVOLUTION TOWARD JUPITER DEVELOPMENT	1
	The 1,000-Mile Missile	2
	The 1,500-Mile Missile	5
	Department of Defense Decision	10
ΙI	BUILDUP FOR JUPITER DEVELOPMENT	14
	Personnel	14
	Facilities	16
	Management	21
	management	••
III	ARMY-NAVY COOPERATIVE PROGRAM	23
	Development Plans	23
	Navy Requirements in the Development Program	32
	Withdrawal From Army Program	34
īv	OPERATIONAL CONTROL TO THE AIR FORCE	37
	Air Force-Army Employment Concept Differences	
-	Administration and Coordination Bog	
	Termination Threat	
	Army-Air Force Cooperative Program	43
v	THE MISSILE	55
	Description	55
	Development Program	
	Production and Delivery	
	Missile Testing Program	80
	Funding	83
VI	TRAINING	87
VII	DEPLOYMENT	98
VIII	PROGRAM DIVIDENDS - SATELLITES	105
	STORY OF SUMMERS OF SUMERS OF SUMMERS OF SUMMERS OF SUMMERS OF SUMMERS OF SUMERS OF SUMMERS OF SUMMERS OF SUMMERS OF SUMMERS OF SUME	
	GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS	113
	APPENDICES	121
	INDEX	173

LIST OF APPENDICES

	Page
١.	Chrom-logy of Highliteant Events in the JUPITER Program 1955-1962 121
2.	ABMA Semiannual Personnel Strength Chart - Feb 56-Dec 59 144
3.	25 Hillion FY 1957 NCA Program
٠.	ABMA Organizational Chart - 1956147
5.	JUPITER Missile Fact Sheet 148
6.	Contractor Structure - JUPITER Missile System 150
Ţ.	JUPITER "A" Firings (25) (R&D) 151
j.	JUPITER "C" Firings (3) (R&D)
϶.	JUPITER RAD Firings (29) (RAD) 157
IJ.	Live System Test (1) and Combat Training Launches (4) 163
11.	Status of JUPITER Air Force MIR's
12.	JUPITER Training Courses 166
13.	JUPITER and JUPITER C Space Mission Firings (17)

VII. (C) DEPLOYMENT


- (C) When the Army and Navy first started the JUPITER development program, the tentative plan called for deployment of the weapon system on or before June 1960. The location of the deployed missile was undefined, and this was the status for better than two years. From time to time the Army attempted to obtain a deployment plan, but was unable to do so. As earlier mentioned, even the GSE development program was held up, and, without this equipment, deployment was impossible.
- (C) The orbiting of SPUTNIK and the decision by OSD to develop both IRBN's brought the deployment aspects of the JUPITER closer to definition, although a specific site was not indicated. The directive simply stated that deployment was to be effected by December 1958.

 SAC's operational plan of March 1958 mentioned too. the emplacements would be located on "the periphery of the Sino-Soviet Bloc," but stated there would be much effort involved in effecting the bilinteral agreement with host countries. In June of 1958, Air Force representatives were discussing possible deployment with French NATO personnel, but France did not become a participant in the JUPITER program.
- (7) By July 1958, the successful deployment of the missile during the year appeared rather unlikely. ABMA had estimated that an initial site selection had to be made by 25 July in order to gain a partial deployment of the first squadron. This date was based on the fact that


I. SACOP 1-58, & Mar 58, subj: SM-78 (JUP) Opnl Plan, Hist Off files.

^{2.} Hist, ABMA, Jan-Jun So, p. 79, Hist Off files.





JUPITER DEPLOYMENT PLAN



DOMEGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS. DOD DIR 5200.10 the contractor needed 215 days to set up the LOX, RIM, munitique, and six emplacement areas. Each day beyond the decision cutoff resulted in a corresponding day of slippage. 3 As it turned out, slippage became

the rule rather than the exception, for it was long past 25 July 1958

· before the necessary agreements were signed.

(U) In view of the protracted delays, a question of manning the squadrons arose in September. Conferences with the proposed host country--Italy--revealed a desire that eventually manning would be completely from the allied nation. Thus, tentative plans indicated USAF manning for the first squadron and NATO manning for the second and subsequent squadron. Later, in November, USAF questioned the advisability of the manning plan unless the agreements were signed by 10 December. To gain the early operational capability, they believed that the second squadron would have to be manned by USAF personnel, as well.

(C) Deployment plans were based on a "floating M date" during the latter part of 1/5. In other words, from the time the agreement was signed, two missiles and supporting GSE would be deployed to be in place 60 days later, and at T-15 readiness at the end of 75 days. The remaining four missiles would be in place at M plus 120 days, and in a cumbat readiness state at 135 days. This particular plan was of short turation, for in marrly 1/50, changes were made to the effect that the total squadron of 1, missiles would deploy. Schedules used a 150-day

^{3.} JUP Prog Rpt for Jal So, 5 Aug So, Hist Off files.

a. JUP Prog Rpt for Sep 50, 3 Oct 50, Hist Off files.

^{5.} JUP Prog Ret for Nov Su, 5 Dec Sô, Hist Off files.

factor between the signing of a technical agreement and shipment of the first equipment, with first 1 March 1959 and then 1 April designated as M-Day. The signing of the government-to-government (GTG) agreement on 26-27 March confirmed the 1 April date for planning purposes.


- was under way, but this was not the case. Italy insisted that the OTG agreement lacked sufficient detail and a technical agreement would have to be signed between the IAF and UEAF. Points of contention involved funding matters, site construction by Italian contractors, and some component fabrication by Italian industry. Discussions on these matters began to stretch out, and by June it was realized that the 1 April N-Day was no longer compatible with a realistic program.


 DOD rescinded the date on 1 July and indicated that the new M-Day would coincide with the signing of the technical agreement. At the same time, it was realized that IAF personnel could man both squadrons.
- (C) The signing of the technical agreement on 10 August removed the last major readblock in the NATO I program. Although from time to time there were instances that threatened delays, the course was relatively smooth when compared with past history. Shortly after the signing, United States Air Forces, Europe (USAFE), notified ABMA that the beneficial occupancy date (BOD) for the first position was 1 April 1960. This meant that deployment planning was no longer based on the 190-day factor, but was based on specific BOD's furnished by the IAF.

^{5.} Hist, ABMA, Jan-Jun 59, pp. 4-5; JUP Prog Ryt for Dec 53, 6 Jan 59, Hist Off files.

^{7.} JUP Prog Rpt for Apr 59, 5 May 59; JUP Prog Rpt for tan 39, 4 da 59, Bist Off files.

^{8.} JUP Prog Rpt for Aug 5), a dep by, Hist off files.






dates were as follows:

Position				Date Turned Over to IAF
1				11 July 1960
2				26 April 1961
3			, **	14 April 1961
4 (•		24 March 1961
. 5				13 February 1961
6				7 June 1961
7				3 March 1961
8				13 June 1961
9				29 April 1961
10	1			20 June 1961

(C) On 28 October 1959, the location of the third and final JUPITER squadron was settled when the GTG agreement was signed with Turkey. Thereafter, the two countries engaged in conferences to complete technical arrangements, plan the facilities, and select the emplacement sites. Tentatively, 1 June 1961 was set as the BCD for the first launch position. To attain this capability in NATO II, initial manning by USAF personnel was required. This arrangement was

^{9.} JUP Qtrly Prog Rpt for 2d Qtr CY 61, 14 Jul 61, Hist Off files.



agreed to by the furkish government in the technical agreement, which was signed on 1 June 1960. By April 1960, all positions were to be ready and manned, and this objective was attained. 10

although the Agency was not directly involved in consummating the agreements with the host countries. Basically, the trouble with NATO I was site selection and who was going to man the squadrons once they were in place. All during 1958, it was quite a strain to have a deployment capability by December 1958. Then, the switch to NATO I manning placed a further tax on ABMA training facilities. In summation, when viewing the development and deployment "ups and downs," it was indeed fortunate that time did not become critical and that all the emplacement positions were readied and manned.



^{10.} Hist, ABMA, Jul-Dec 59, p. 15, Hist Off files; Interview, Mr. Prince Danley, REDSTONE-CORPORAL-JUPITER Project Off, ACMC, 11 Jul 62.

TRANSCRIBED COPY FOLLOWS

Text from chart on page six:

MAJOR JUPITER DEVELOPMENT MILESTONES

MISSILE

FIRST MISSILE LAUNCHED (1A)

MSL ACHIEVES INTERMEDIATE RANGE (1)

FLT TEST OF STABILIZED PLATFORM (1)

MODEL NOSE CONE RECOVERED (C40)

ACTIVE GUIDANCE INTRODUCED (3)

FLIGHT TEST OF NOSE CONE (3)

FULL SCALE NOSE CONE RECOVERED (5)

FLT TEST OF FUSE 8 S8A DEVICE (5)

COMPLETE CLOSED LOOP GUIDANCE (6)

FLT TEST OF XW 49 WARHEAD ENVIRONMENT (6)

FIRST MSL DELIVERED TO USAF (101)

GROUND EQUIPMENT

FIRST MISSILE DRY LAUNCHED

TACTICAL LAUNCHER 8 ERECTION EQPT DEMO

RAPID PROPELLANT LOADING DEMONSTRATED

DRY LAUNCH SIMULATE UNDER TACT. FLD. COND.

LAYING SCHEME DEMONSTRATED

GROUND SYSTEM BREADBOARD TEST

AUTO. 15 MIN. COUNTDOWN WITH TACT. EQPT.